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Over the last 15 years, banks have broadened their sphere of business. Having previously focused largely 
on lending, they have become major traders of debt instruments.  
In the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, there has been increased regulatory scrutiny of 
banks. There have also been calls for them to separate their trading and deposit-taking functions, with a 
view to lowering their overall risk profiles. However, it is open to question as to whether this has 
occurred.  
Over the last 15 years, banks have increasingly looked beyond interest income for sources of revenue.   
This paper examines whether the market environment in which banks operate can explain the cross-
country variation evident in the extent to which banks choose to diversify their revenue sources.  
The move by banks to venture into trading of debt instruments has been cited as a primary cause of the 
global financial crisis (GFC). This has prompted increased regulatory scrutiny of banks. Specifically, it has led 
to calls for banks to separate their deposit-taking divisions, which are regarded as relatively low-risk, from 
investment banking and trading, which are regarded as higher-risk areas of operation.  
A general trend towards requiring banks to reduce the risk associated with their operations has prompted 
legislative and policy measures in the US, the UK, and Europe, which may limit the proprietary trading 
activities of large banks. These proposals reflect the underlying assumption that non-core business 
increases the systemic risk of banks.  
To gain a greater insight into the relation between non-core business activities and systemic risk, this paper 
investigates the motivation underlying particular business investments, and how different business 
activities impact banks’ income streams.  
The paper examines market structure in terms of the degree of market concentration. Individual markets 
are divided into two broad groups, depending on whether they exhibit a high or low degree of 
concentration. In a general sense, heightened competition serves to raise banks’ risk profiles, because 
banks typically respond to increased competition in their core lending markets by diversifying their business 
operations to incorporate more non-interest activities. Furthermore, greater competition increases the 
likelihood of bankers making lower-quality loans to increase potential profits.  
 
 
 
 
In addition, the paper investigates the extent to which concentration leads to variability in banks’ non-
interest income, and the extent to which varying degrees of competition impact the stability, or systemic 
risk, of the overall banking system. For the purposes of the study, systemic risk is regarded as the risk of a 
crisis that weakens the intermediation capacity of the overall financial sector.  
Non-interest income may be used to reduce the volatility of a bank’s income and improve its profitability, 
or to take on riskier business with a view to boosting shareholder returns. The study shows that where 
banks do not have monopoly pricing power in setting lending rates, they tend to pursue non-interest 
income opportunities with a view to boosting their return on equity rather than reducing their revenue 
volatility.  
Based on an analysis that measures countries based on the concentration of their banking systems, the 
study finds that regulations limiting non-interest income may not necessarily reduce the level of systemic 
risk for all banks.  
The study shows that the relationship between bank diversification and systemic risk is not homogenous. 
Furthermore, the degree of market concentration appears to influence the specific types of non-interest 
income activities banks choose, and the extent of their commitments to these activities.  
From a regulatory policy perspective, the study results reveal a particularly significant finding for high-
concentration markets such as Australia. Specifically, it is found that an increase in non-lending activities 
would contribute to a reduction in systemic risk for Australian banks. This finding makes intuitive sense 
from the point of view of diversification. In a concentrated banking market, such as ours, it stands to reason 
that the impact of any weakness within in a particular market segment, or within a particular lender, will 
soon be felt elsewhere in the market. Alternatively, if lenders expand into other areas where their 
competitors have less of a market presence, the potential for an overlap of their respective activities 
correspondingly declines.  
In countries where the degree of bank sector concentration is lower, non-interest income activities may 
produce an incremental benefit to shareholder returns, reflecting higher profit margins that may be on 
offer in these areas. However, unlike high-concentration markets, expansion beyond traditional lending 
activities may not necessarily lead to a reduction in risk. In contrast, the risk profile of the organisation may 
in fact increase.  
The study demonstrates that the effect of non-interest income on systemic risk is complex. Specifically, 
non-interest income can have a legitimate place in reducing the systemic risk of a bank, as long as the focus 
of non-interest income is to reduce the volatility of income rather than solely to increase shareholder 
returns.  
In addition, the study shows how market concentration impacts the individual business models adopted by 
banks. In particular, banks increasingly favour business activities that target a high return on equity when 
faced with increased competition. This builds on the literature which shows that banks increase their risk-
taking in competitive banking systems.  
 
